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Abstract 
 
The study is concerned with the usefulness of using audit data analytics of unregulated 
voluntary disclosures in reducing the auditing expectations gap. It argues that the lack 
of credibility and assurance of the unstructured voluntary disclosures and other big 
data, will impact the level of public users’ expectations towards the quality of these 
unregulated voluntary disclosures. Therefore, we argue that non-financial, as well as 
financial; data require assurance by an independent auditor. Consequently, this would 
expand the auditors’ role and responsibilities which will lead to raising the degree of 
stakeholders’ satisfaction and approaching their expectations potentially reducing the 
auditing expectations gap.  
 
Auditors will need to rely more heavily on big data analytics and technological 
techniques to perform this new role efficiently and effectively. Therefore, we provide  
empirical evidence that the perceptions of auditors, bankers, investors and academics, 
support the use of audit data analytics when providing assurance of unregulated 
voluntary disclosures in reducing auditing expectations gap. To do so, we categorized 
unregulated voluntary  into 8 different categories that auditing data analytics is 
required to capture from various sources and analyze in an informative and useful 
fashion. 
 
Keywords: Auditing Data Analytics (ADA), Unregulated Voluntary Disclosures (UVD), 
Auditing Expectations Gap (AEG), Unregulated Voluntary Disclosures Assurance 
(UVDA), Stakeholders-agency theory, Environmental disclosures, Corporate 
governance, Mann-Whitney-U non-parametric test, Risk management disclosures. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Big Data is characterized by large volume captured from different sources, 
variety of nature whether structured or unstructured, velocity in terms of data dynamic 
and change over time, veracity regarding the quality of data and usefulness for 
different purposes (Hashem et al, 2015). Given the massive corporate investment in 
big data of $34 billion in 2013 increasing to $232 billion in 2016, big 4 accounting firms 
recognize the importance of big data to improving quality of assurance services they 
provide to their clients (Alles and Gray, 2016).  In the audit context, incorporating big 
data in assurance services means moving beyond traditional financial accounting 
information, represented by the traditional structured financial statements regulated by 
the accounting standards and audited in compliance with the statuary audit standards 
and regulations, towards unstructured non-financial data. Consequently, traditional 
data analytics techniques need to be upgraded from using simple Excel spreadsheets 
to analyze samples of accounting data to more advanced analytical tools to visualize 
big unstructured data and analyze predictions built on them (Alles and Gray, 2016).   
In our study, we believe that voluntary disclosures will be a fair representation of 
unstructured non-financial big data available in the annual reports to stakeholders.  
This study contributes to existing knowledge by providing evidence that providing 
an ‘’absolute’’ rather than ‘’reasonable’’ degree of assurance and credibility of 
voluntary disclosures and unstructured data, given the complexities of this type of data 
and the advanced analytical techniques they require, is highly appreciated by different 
stakeholders and users of this type of information. The usefulness of data and 
disclosures, regardless their standards and structures, depends on the level of their 
credibility and assurance and not just their completeness.  
 
2. Auditing Expectations Gap Defined 
 
Liggio (1974) defines the Auditing Expectations Gap (thereafter AEG) as ‘the 
difference between the levels of expected performance as envisioned by both the 
independent accountant and by the user of financial statements’ (p.27). The 
expectations that assurance affect investors’ judgment stems from the argument that 
independently audited information reduces information asymmetry and decreases 
uncertainty (Wallace, 1987).   
 
3. Unregulated Voluntary Disclosures Assurance (UVDA) 
 
Investors increase reliance on voluntary disclosures when assurance is provided 
on this type of information (Coram, 2004).  Furthermore, Abdel-khalik (1993), Chow 
(1982), and Watts and Zimmerman (1983) provide significant evidence that shows the 
increasing demand for auditing regulated and unregulated information to provide 
assurance to stakeholders. Unregulated information will go beyond traditional data 
available and will expand to big data originated from new sources such as images, 
videos, emails, phone calls, Internet activities, social media, news and public 
information (Zhang et al., 2011). With this sort of big data, different type of continuous 
audit, using big data analytics techniques, is required to deal with this massive volume 
of data and transactions. In this case, Auditing Data Analytics (thereafter ADA)  will 
provide better understanding of this data, increase the scale of auditing making it more 
frequent to provide real time assurance and information credibility (Vasarhelyi et al, 
2010). This will require updating the audit data provisioning, data filtering and the data 
3 
diagnostic layer to accommodate big data analytics (Vasarhelyi et al, 2004). This real 
time paperless audit will require massive technological investments as well as training 
and development to ensure auditors’ competency in using ADA achieving a valuable 
balance between audit techniques and professional judgement.  
In the absence of any mandatory non-financial disclosure requirements, and the 
caution concerning the bias towards disclosing only the good news (Deegan, 2000; 
Deegan, 2002; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Neu et al, 1998). Hunton et al. (2000) find 
that auditor provided electronic commerce assurance has a positive impact on 
earnings forecasts and stock price estimates. 
In the absence of credible information, we believe that big data, especially 
unstructured is a double edged sword, it might be a big opportunity, but at the same 
time a massive threat, as stakeholders tend to assume the worst. Consequently, 
stakeholders will discount the firm’s stock prices, and would not react passively to the 
lack of information. However, they would choose to privately collect and analyze data. 
Due to the high cost of collecting and analyzing such data, only stakeholders with 
available resources would do so. Therefore, unsophisticated stakeholders are driven 
out of the market that becomes less efficient. The remaining stakeholders in the 
market would face high transaction cost, lower trading volume and illiquidity, therefore, 
they bid down a firm’s stock price (Karpoff, 1986; Lev, 1988).  
Investors find it difficult to evaluate the impact of the Unregulated Voluntary 
Disclosures (thereafter UVD) on future earnings (Rajgopal et al, 2003). Furthermore, 
the Elliott Committee (1997) suggests that there are new opportunities for assurance 
services to add value to the external audit because of the new types of information 
used by decision makers. It defines assurance services as ‘independent professional 
services that improve the quality of information, or its context, for decision makers’. 
The usefulness of UVD is a questionable issue as it does not impact in the 
informative power of the stock price (Gelb and Zarowin, 2000). Investors evaluate the 
audited financial reporting as more credible than the un-audited information and were 
more optimistic about firm’s future earnings based on the audited financial reporting 
(Hodge, 2001). Therefore, information relevance includes the traits of timeliness and 
predictive value for decision making, while reliability contains the traits of 
representational faithfulness, verifiability, and neutrality which differ with respect to the 
nature of items. Such traits are easy to attain for financial information but not for 
intellectual capital and social costs which needs to be quantified (Joseph, 2007). 
Auditing is a way to improve information reliability and credibility. Therefore, 
managers producing UVDs might also voluntarily hire an auditor. Having a voluntary 
audit makes managers’ disclosures more credible to users than they would be without 
an audit. Society may require auditing voluntary disclosures than GAAP audit, which 
provides greater protection of users (Power, 1997, 1999; Jamal and Sunder, 2006). 
Auditors, as well as users, need to pay more attention to non-financial information. 
Any organization incurs a disclosure cost in case of disclosing private 
information. The disclosure costs include the preparation costs in addition to the cost 
of contracting an auditor (Verrecchia, 1983). Incurring auditing costs improves the 
trustfulness of the private information, as it is the only way to make UVDs credible to 
the public. The importance of auditing these disclosures, is that bad information can 
be kept private, whilst good information is publicity disclosed.  The managers’ incentive 
for disclosing bad information is driven by firm’s reputation and litigation threats 
besides the proprietary costs that face the firm (Skinner, 1994).   
The market places a stock price premium on independently audited information 
(Dopuch et al, 1986; Willenborg, 1999). Therefore, the provision of information 
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assurance services is a natural extension of the traditional financial audit role (Elliott, 
1998). Quality financial reporting is an important key to increase the auditors’ ability to 
add value by reducing uncertainty about the quality of information included in 
management’s reports rather than just ensuring management’s compliance with 
technical GAAP (Miller and Bahnson, 2002). Under the disclosure principle, the 
released information must be credible. One way to secure the credibility is that the 
released information is attested by a third party such as an auditor (Scott, 2003).  
However, it is stated that ‘more assurance will not necessarily mean more and better 
accountability, but merely more ‘value added’ for management as they manage key 
risks imposed by various stakeholder group who need to be controlled’ (Power, 1997, 
p.127). 
The Global Reporting Initiative’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (GRI 2002) 
emphasize the need for independent assurance to add to the credibility of 
sustainability reports: ‘A range of factors influences the perceptions and expectations 
of users about the credibility of an organization’s sustainability report. Consultation 
with stakeholders is the best way to ascertain stakeholder perceptions and 
expectations about building credibility’ (pp.17-18). One of the key criticisms of the 
voluntary social, ethical and sustainability reports is the existence of the huge AEG 
(Kamp-Roelands, 1999). Therefore, the assurance provision for social and 
environmental reporting, as one of the voluntary disclosure categories, is necessary 
to add credibility and reduce AEG (Gonella and Woo, 2000; Lewellyn, 2000).  
Furthermore, the need for external verification and assurance is supported by 
several key assertions. First, external verification improves environmental reporting 
because of the scrutiny inherent in such an examination. Second, external verification 
of periodic environmental reports will provide additional credibility and assurance to 
the annual financial reports with environmental considerations. Third, the threat of 
litigation and other actions by shareholders or regulatory authorities for 
misrepresentations in the periodic environmental reports may be reduced by third 
party verification. Therefore, external verification may prevent corporations from 
disclosing inaccurate or misleading information and ensuring that the disclosure is 
reliable. Fourth, without credibility offered by the external verification, some investors 
may consider the environmental reporting is a sort of ‘green wash’ (Aeppel, 1993; 
Greer and Bruno, 1996). In addition, the corporations to secure their reputations 
against the risk of disclosing untruthful information, many of them now have their 
disclosure verified (audited) by independent experts in social, environmental, and 
ethical field (Lann, 2006).     
The audit profession should widen its scope to encapsulate environmental issues 
as to keep its position as a source of credibility of information for the diversified 
stakeholders. Therefore, there is a crucial need to activate the role of audit profession 
regarding the environmental issues remain to maintain the auditor report of being 
reliable by the diverse users (Dixon et al, 2004). The auditor’s role in reducing the 
uncertainty about the low-quality information in GAAP financial statements would not 
be useful as providing more comfort in consuming and relying on the unregulated 
reporting. It is believed that the new supplemental unregulated reporting offers a 
special opportunity to auditors to add much more value to their clients (users) by 
quality financial reporting consultation services (Miller and Bahnson, 2002). 
In addition, Karapetrovic (2002) defines a universal audit as ‘an independent and 
documented system for obtaining and verifying material audit evidence, objectively 
examining the evidence against the stated audit criteria based on audit risk and 
reporting the audit findings to the client’ (pp.150-151). Such audit definition includes 
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not only financial audit, but includes other diversified types of audits including UVDs. 
In this case, auditors are ‘data scientists’ who deal with big data providing ‘appropriate’ 
assurance and analytics. Therefore, available data, cloud or otherwise, need to be 
audited, to exercise professional principles, such as conservatism, reliability and 
timeliness of information and to resolve the conflict between old professional values 
and new technology developments (Al-Htaybat and Alberti-Alhtaybat, 2017).     
 
4. Audit Data Analytics Regulations 
 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in 2017 and the International Auditing 
and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) in 2016 called for a review to the use of ADA 
by auditors to share good practices and continuous improvement of audit quality. We 
are expecting that using ADA for UVDA, will not just improve audit quality, but will go 
further by expanding the scope of audit beyond statutory audit of financial statements 
to meet stakeholders’ needs and expectations. IAASB (2016) recommended that 
auditors need to capture better evidences to acquire broader and deeper 
understanding of the entity’s environment, risk and business operations. We believe 
that auditors need to get clear insights using unregulated disclosures to have better 
understanding of business sustainability and future.  
Moreover, KPMG (2002) suggests that the verification arises from ‘the demand 
for reliable and credible information from management, for managing the company’s 
environmental and social risks, and from stakeholders who want assurance that the 
report truly represents the company’s efforts and achievements’ (p.18). The 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) (2003) states that ‘all 
organizations want to show themselves in the best possible light. ACCA believes that 
independent external assurance is a vital part of the credibility and trust building 
process. The role of independent assurance is to ensure that the reporter presents an 
account that is fair, complete, unbiased and relevant’ (p.7). 
The Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE), the body of 
accounting professions in Europe publishes its assurance on sustainability report and 
stated that ‘the assurance provider issues a report that enables users to place more 
credibility on the information reported by the company. Each user of the report may 
benefit through being able to take decisions based on information in sustainability 
report with less uncertainty about the information’. Moreover, the FEE report desire is 
to avoid creating an expectation gap ‘whereby a user mistakenly assumes that there 
is more assurance than is actually present’ (FEE, 2002, p.17). 
From a US perspectives, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, in section (201) 
regarding services outside the scope of practice of auditors, identifies that ‘it shall be 
unlawful for a registered public accounting firm (and any associate person of that firm, 
to the extend determined appropriate by the commission) that performs for any issuer 
any audit…….to provide to that issuer, contemporaneously with the audit, any non-
audit service’. This implies that clients will appoint different audit firm to the one they 
are dealing with to audit their financial statements to audit their voluntary disclosures, 
since it is classified as a non-audit service. This will expand the oversight provisions, 
which in turn will enhance the information credibility.  
 
5. Unregulated Voluntary Disclosures and Information Asymmetry 
 
Reporting growth is supporting the notion ‘data is the new oil’  (Al-Htaybat and 
Alberti-Alhtaybat, 2017) especially environmental, social, and sustainable reporting, 
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which is driven by a realization that growing levels of disclosure are being 
undetermined by a credibility gap arising from the lack of confidence in both data and 
the reporting organizations (Doane, 2000; Swift and Dando, 2002; Dando and Swift, 
2003).  Release of financial disclosures via social media applications, such as Twitter, 
can reduce information asymmetry (Al-Htaybat and Alberti-Alhtaybat, 2017).  
Miller and Bahnson (2002) state that ‘incomplete information can be caused by 
omissions, misrepresentations, or simply lack of trustworthiness. Even if the managers 
are telling the truth, no one will act on it if they don’t trust the reports’ (p.23). Moreover, 
the uncertainty about the past and present leads to uncertainty and lack of confidence 
about the future predictions. Therefore, investors and creditors are demanding a 
higher rate of return to compensate for the uncertain outcome representing high cost 
of capital for the managers. Furthermore, to reduce the information asymmetry, 
investors and other outsiders are being provided relevant information that enables 
them to assess the firm’s future. In addition, the provided information needs to be 
reliable and free from bias or other management manipulation (Scott, 2003).  
Assurance would have a positive effect on users’ stock price estimates and 
forecasts in case of the positive disclosures due to the reduction of uncertainty using 
information assurance. While in the case of negative disclosures assurance would not 
make any difference to users (Coram, 2004). Furthermore, audited information is more 
credible than un-audited information (Johnson et al, 1983; Libby, 1979; Pany and 
Smith; 1982).  Provision of assurance increases user’s perceptions of non-financial 
reliability as the independently audited information reduces information asymmetry 
and decreases uncertainty. Therefore, the value of assurance on disclosure is not 
independent of the signal provided by disclosure (Coram, 2004).  
Audit effectiveness adds value for investors as research shows that capital 
providers require firms to hire an independent auditor as a condition of financing, even 
when it is not required by regulation (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Moreover, banks 
require firms to present audited financial information, even for private companies. This 
shows that capital providers regard auditors as enhancement to the credibility of the 
presented information (Leftwich, 1983). 
UVDs reduce information asymmetry between the managers and outside 
investors. Reduction of information asymmetry reduces the cost of capital by reducing 
information risk, but this solution is restricted by the costs associated with the 
credibility of voluntary disclosures (Barry and Brown, 1985, 1986; Merton, 1987). The 
value of unregulated disclosures in capital markets, depends on the degree of 
credibility of the disclosed information. As UVD is self-serving, it is not clear whether 
these disclosures are credible (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Studies such as Waymire (1984), Ajinkya and Gift (1984), and Pownall and 
Waymire (1989) find that stock prices react positively to the management forecasts of 
earnings increases, and vice versa. However, management forecasts accuracy can 
easily be verified by investors by actual earnings realization without need for the 
voluntary disclosures. 
Dye (2001) states that ‘the theory of voluntary disclosure is a special case of 
game theory with the following central premise: any entity contemplating making a 
disclosure will disclose information that is favorable to the entity, and will not disclose 
information unfavorable to the entity’ (p.184). Managers may disclose information that 
reduces a firm’s stock price and delay disclosing information that increases firm’s stock 
price (Aboody and Kaznik, 1999). Furthermore, managers are disclosing bad news 
prior to management buyout, or prior to union negotiations. This shows that voluntary 
disclosures is used as stock prices’ control instrument rather than reducing information 
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asymmetry (Liberty and Zimmerman, 1986). Moreover, the presence of multiple 
audience (stakeholders), besides the investors in the capital market, such as 
competitors in the product market, consumers, suppliers, employees, labor unions, 
creditors, and regulatory authorities, managers may disclose bad news to inflate the 
investor’s expectations by deflating the expectations of the other audience (Darrough 
and Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990). 
 
6. Theoretical Framework   
 
6.1 Agency Theory  
 
Live streaming data will require significant changes to the audit process (Al-
Htaybat and Alberti-Alhtaybat, 2017). Accordingly, one monitoring device that 
shareholders can use to observe manager’s behavior is appointing external auditors. 
An audit firm influences the amount of information disclosed in financial statements 
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971). Moreover, referred to the accountability paradigm, the 
agent or the management cannot be trusted to provide information that may serve 
stakeholders interests. Therefore, accountability is not essentially concerned with 
discretionary or voluntary disclosures (Swift, 2001). Furthermore, the use of reputable 
auditors reflects the associated agency costs with the disclosure decisions and a 
signal to the market that the information disclosures are of high quality (Craswell and 
Taylor, 1992).  
Unregulated disclosures have low, and in some cases a negative, coefficient with 
future earnings which indicates that voluntary disclosures mislead analysts’ perception 
regarding firms’ future. These results raise a question about the value relevant 
information about the future earnings (Banghøj and Plenborg, 2006). In the sense of 
agency theory, managers who have better information than other outsiders, can make 
credible and reliable communication to the market to enhance the company’s value. 
This enhancement of the company’s value in the market, reduces monitoring costs 
and in turn reduces the agency costs. Therefore, the more accurate and reliable 
information companies disclose, the better companies’ perception received by the 
public (Barako et al, 2006). Accounting reports can affect the real decisions made by 
managers and other users, rather than just reflecting the results of these decisions. 
This argument illustrates the importance of disclosure, in directing stakeholders to 
different decisions stimulating the relative importance of disclosure credibility (Zeff, 
1978). 
In contrast, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency theory explains why 
accounting reports are provided voluntarily to creditors and stockholders, and why 
independent auditors are engaged by management to testify and verify the 
correctness and accuracy of the provided reports. Managers are willing to incur costs 
to improve the credibility of accounting reports before doing so as a law requirement. 
Moreover, in the sense of agency theory, minimizing agency monitoring costs is 
economic incentive for managers to report reliable accounting reports to the ownership 
(Wolk and Tearney, 1997). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1982) state that ‘an audit will be successful in changing 
expectations and hence reducing the opportunistic behavior costs (agency costs) 
borne by the managers only if it is expected that the auditor will report some discovered 
breaches of contract. The probability that the auditors will report a discovered breach 
is effectively enhancing the auditing profession’s definition of independence’ (p.11).  
Moreover, Elliott (1998) states that ‘audit provides assurance that an information set 
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presented to investors and creditors is reliable. But the market place need for high-
quality information, is far greater than just the need for reliable historical cost-based 
financial statements’ (p.2). Moreover, the Elliott Committee (1997) identifies the 
opportunity to provide assurance services, in relation to risk assessments, business 
performance measurements, and information system reliability. The heart of the 
minimum auditing, is to create value by reducing investors’ uncertainty and to improve 
the overall financial reporting quality, rather than just attesting to management 
compliance with GAAP, leading to their clients’ satisfaction (Miller and Bahnson, 
2002). 
Moreover, stakeholders are the main concern of the auditor, in performing his 
duties towards assuring the credibility of the voluntary disclosures. Therefore, it is 
stated that ‘the assurance provider evaluates whether the reporting organization has 
responded to stakeholders’ concerns, policies and relevant standards and adequately 
communicated these responses in its report’ (AccountAbility, 2003, p.18). However, 
the agency problem of adverse selection or hidden information appears if the auditors 
do not discover this information. To overcome this problem, auditors seek to signal  
their quality by their actions in offering quality services (Bromwich, 1992). 
Moreover, only the supply of financial information leads to unproductive 
behaviors and outcomes, while providing the information demanded by the capital 
markets produce changes in the roles played by managers, auditors, financial 
statement users, standards setters, and regulators (Miller and Bahnson, 2002). Adams 
and Evans (2004) provide some assurance guidelines as key principles for the 
assurance of ethical, social, and environmental reports. The aim of these guidelines is 
to reduce AEG.  
 
6.2 Stakeholders’ Theory 
 
To enhance trust in reporting assurance, providers need to be well connected to 
the stakeholders and understand their issues well (Henriques, 2003). Therefore, key 
stakeholders must be identified clearly, as addressing assurance statement to specific 
stakeholder has implications for assurance on materiality of the information provided. 
The information is deemed material, if its’ omission or misrepresentation, could 
influence the decisions and actions of stakeholders (Owen and O’Dwyer, 2004). In 
terms of stakeholders, materiality is a crucial issue around assurance. It is stated that 
‘if stakeholders don’t think the information is relevant or material, it just won’t count’ 
(Zadek, 2003). 
Auditing has different objectives, such as the provision of independent opinion 
upon the company’s financial statements, improving management performance, and 
controlling and monitoring the company’s activities. The studies address the 
importance of auditing in providing credibility to accounting information which assists 
the different stakeholders in making their decisions (Owen et al, 2000; Wood, 1991; 
Brown, 1962; Gwilliam, 1988; Wallace, 1987; Show et al, 1980; Coopers and Lybrand, 
1984). Stakeholders are not just asking for big data, they need analytics. This will 
enable them to get the right answers to the questions they are asking. Even asking 
the right questions. Auditors play an important role in verifying and validating the 
enterprise’s stewardship reports (Bromwich, 1992). They need big data to know 
stakeholders’ questions to provide the right answers. Therefore, the purchase of audit 
results in having reported information likely free from misrepresentation and thus more 
credible (Barton and Waymire, 2003).  
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6.3 The Attribution theory 
 
The attribution theory explains how users perceive voluntary disclosures of non-
financial information (Kent and Martinko, 1995). Koonce and Mercer (2002) use the 
attribution theory to show the users’ perception towards these disclosures. It is 
expected that investors would discount positive disclosures as self-serving, but would 
not do so for the negative disclosures, as they are not considered to be self-serving. 
Based on the attribution theory, users would be more uncertain about the validity of 
the self-serving information and discount it. Thus, owners face moral dilemmas, due 
to the inaccuracy of evaluating and determining the value of decisions made. This is 
because, the agent takes advantage of the lack of observability of his/her actions and 
practices to enhance his/her personal goals referred to the agent-principal conflicts 
(Barako et al, 2006). 
 
Figure 1 Theoretical Framework 
 
7. Research Methodology 
 
The model used in this study is driven from the theoretical framework 
constructed, shown in figure 1, based on the empirical evidences and the notion of the 
utilised theories. The model is examining the impact of using ADA in UVDA on 
reducing the AEG. The reason of using ADA, is due to the nature of structured and 
unstructured data used, which is characterized by 6 features, value, velocity, 
variability, volume and velocity and veracity. It is shown in the theoretical framework, 
that providing UVDA, using ADA, will expand the role of auditor, to provide additional 
assurance service to improve the credibility, reliability and add value to UVDs, this will 
lead to meeting the expectations of the different stockholders, investors, bankers and 
academics, resulting in the reduction of AEG.  Therefore, this research is applied using 
the questionnaire technique which is designed based on 5-Point Likert scale that 
include 5 different scales for the answers on the questions; strongly agree, agree, 
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neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree. Answers are numbered from 1 to 5. 1 
represents the strongly agree opinion, 2 represents the agree opinion, 3 is the neutral, 
4 is the disagree opinion, and 5 is the strongly disagree opinion. The questionnaire 
aims to measure the perceptions of the different categories of the sample, towards the 
role of UVDA using ADA in reducing AEG. The current research use a self-
administrated delivery and collection questionnaire to distribute and then collect the 
questionnaire hand to hand, to ensure having acceptable response rate which affect 
the validity of the research results.  
The questionnaire is self-administered using a mix of online and delivery and 
collection questionnaires to ensure having an acceptable and sufficient response rate. 
The auditors sample is collected mainly from the big 4 audit firms. For bankers they 
are from the main big banks, but not normally distributed among this sample of banks. 
For academics, this is collected from the accounting departments of different 
universities. Finally, the investors sample, is primarily focusing on brokers in the stock 
market who trade on behave of small investors.  
An empirical model is used to test the hypothesis of the study regarding the 
examination of the effectiveness of ADA of un-regulated voluntary disclosers in 
reducing AEG. The agreement or disagreement upon the entire statement shows the 
usefulness of the ADA for an un-regulate voluntary disclosure item in reducing AEG. 
Although the statement is useful in reducing such a gap, it could not be as effective in 
performing the required reduction of the gap. Therefore, there is further test used to 
examine the effectiveness of each statement which shows the overall effectiveness of 
the examined method of reducing the existing expectations gap.     
 
7.1 The Sample Population 
 
The current research is based upon the stakeholder-agency theory; therefore, 
the selected sample should be a representative of the different stakeholders with their 
various backgrounds, educations and empowerments. As a result, the current 
research uses a sample composed of three groups of users; auditors, investors, 
bankers in line with prior studies. However, the current research adds to the previously 
mentioned groups a sample of academics. The academics are included in the sample 
as they may well play a consulting role in the standard setting process. The four 
sample groups would have equal weights as to overcome any bias that may exists 
towards any category. Since the sample is categorized over four categories, therefore 
the sample size must be divisible equally by the 4 categories which may results in 
selecting a sample of 400 respondents (Dixon et al, 2006; Manson and Zaman, 2000; 
Best, 1999; Fadzly and Ahmad, 2004). 
 
7.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
Un-regulated voluntary disclosure is information disclosed by corporations in 
addition to their mandatory disclosure regulated by the standards. This disclosure is 
useful to improve the decision-making process of the different users. It is composed 
of different categories such as: general information disclosure, human resources 
disclosure, extra financial analysis tools disclosure, risk management disclosure, 
research and development disclosure. ADA of UVD using ADA is an effective solution 
to reduce AEG. It is measured using the different perceptions of different categories 
of the examined sample by a five-point Likert scale that transform the perceptions to 
values as to identify the effectiveness of ADA of un-regulated voluntary disclosures in 
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reducing AEG. 
The dependent variable of the research is the AEG. Therefore, the proposed 
solution is the main concern of the study to examine the role of UVDA using ADA in 
reducing AEG. Consequently, this model tests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis – UVDA of UVD using ADA of is an effective method of reducing the AEG 
 
7.3 Model Statistical Tests 
 
The model will be examined using Mann-Whitney-U non-parametric test for 
significant difference between auditors and each non-audit group (academics, 
investors, and bankers) from one side, and between auditors and the overall non-audit 
groups from the other side. The Mann-Whitney-U non-parametric test is employed 
since it examines the significant difference in response means between two 
populations based on the Z scores and p values of the examined variables without the 
need to test for normality as this test is used even if the distribution was normal. 
However, the normality of distribution is examined using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
(Best, 1999). 
A t-test is applied over the examined sample as to examine the sensitivity of the 
results towards changing the type of statistical test by using a parametric test instead 
of the main Mann-Whitney-U non-parametric test.  
 
8. Discussion and Results 
 
8.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
The descriptive study shows the response rate of study and the details of this 
response rate for each group of the examined sample. In addition, the analysis 
emphasises the accounting qualification and past-experience of the sample, and 
experience of each group in his/her occupation. 
 
Table (1) 
Response Rates and Demographic Details of Participants 
Group Survey 
Sent 
Response 
Received 
Accounting 
Qualification 
Accounting 
Experience 
   Yes No Yes No 
Auditors 100 31 31 0 31 0 
Academics 100 33 33 0 33 0 
Investors 100 34 18 16 15 19 
Bankers 100 29 24 5 26 3 
Total 400 127 106 21 105 22 
 
Results in table 1 indicate that the overall response rate is 31.75 per cent which 
is an acceptable rate for using this type of data collection tool (Dixon et al, 2006; 
Manson and Zaman, 2000; Best, 1999; Dewing and Russel, 2002; Fadzly and Ahmad, 
2004). It is noted that auditors and academics groups have got accounting 
qualifications, while bankers and investors groups vary between having accounting 
qualifications and not having accounting qualifications, since nearly half the investors 
group sample have accounting qualifications while the second half not, which presents 
a variety of the sample qualifications. Moreover, like the accounting qualifications, all 
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the auditors and academics included in the sample have accounting experience, while 
most the bankers have got accounting experience. Although most of investors group 
have no accounting experience, the sample is balanced representing variety of 
different investors which supports the well representation of the sample for the whole 
population.  
 
Table (2) 
Accounting Experience of Responses 
Group None 2-5 Years    5-10 Years   More than 10 
Years 
 n % N % N % N % 
Auditors 
(n=31) 
0 0 11 35.5 8 25.8 12 38.7 
Academics 
(n=33) 
0 0 14 42.4 2 6.1 17 51.5 
Investors 
(n=34) 
18 53 3 8.8 7 20.6 6 17.6 
Bankers 
(n=29) 
0 0 3 10.3 11 38 15 51.7 
Total (n=127) 18 14.2 31 24.4 28 22 50 39.4 
 
Results of table 2 present the variation of the accounting experience of the 
different respondents. Most of the auditors’ sample had more than 10 years of 
experience indicating the inclusiveness of senior members in the sample as indicator 
of the awareness of the relatively new terminologies included in the questionnaire. 
However, the sample includes other auditors with different experiences to ensure that 
the sample is well representative for the whole population. Regarding the academics 
group, it contains diversified groups of accounting experience to maintain the balance 
between the different experiences, which is reflected on the perception of the 
respondent. However, most the bankers’ sample had more than 10 years of 
experience which indicates that the study focused on the perceptions of the senior 
bankers rather than the other categories of experienced bankers.  
Accumulatively, the overall sample is balanced between having no experience 
and having more than ten years’ experience, indicating that the sample is 
representative of the whole population of the four examined groups. 
 
Table (3) 
Occupational Experience of Responses 
Group 2-5 Years 5-10 Years More than 10 
Years 
 N % N % N % 
Auditors (n=31) 12 38.7 15 48.4 4 12.9 
Academics 
(n=33) 
14 42.4 5 15.2 14 42.4 
Investors (n=34) 28 82.4 4 11.8 2 5.8 
Bankers (n=29) 8 27.6 11 37.9 10 34.5 
Total (n=127) 62 48.5 35 27.5 30 24 
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The occupational experience of responses presented in table 3 shows the 
number of years each group of respondents still in his occupation as auditor, 
academic, investor, and banker. This table indicates that most of the auditors are in 
their career for 5–10 years. However, the academics sample is scattered over the 
scale as it includes equal proportion of the new fresher academics with 2-5 years’ 
academic experience, and the experienced academics with more than 10 years’ 
academic experience. That’s reflected on the diversification of the academic 
perceptions. In contrast with the academic sample, the bankers sample is well 
distributed over the different ranges of experience, which guarantee that the sample 
represents the whole population.  
However, the investors sample is concentrated on those dealing with the stock 
market for 2-5 years. The overall sample is concentrated towards the 2-5 years of 
experience with nearly equally distribution on the remaining experience ranges.    
 
8.2 Hypothesis Testing 
 
The hypothesis examined by this analysis of the effectiveness of ADA of un-
regulated voluntary disclosures towards reducing AEG. Whether this data is available 
in the annual report, on the cloud, social media or on the company’s website.  The 
hypothesis is tested based on the significant differences between the perceptions of 
the auditors’ group compare to each non-audit groups including academics, investors 
and bankers. In addition, it compares the significant difference of the auditors’ group 
compared to the overall perceptions of the non-auditor groups. Accordingly, using the 
Likert scale is useful in the analysis of the different perceptions as it has a cutting point, 
which is 3 in our case, a yardstick used to differentiate between the different 
perceptions. 
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Table (4) 
The Role of UVDA using ADA in Reducing AEG 
(Comparative Mean Response) 
Statements Mean Responses 
 Auditors Academics Investors Bankers Overall 
1. General Disclosure      
1.1 Mission & vision. 3.97 1.27*# 1.29*# 1.24*# 1.27*# 
1.2 Statement of corporate 
strategy. 
2.32 1.49*# 1.56*# 1.34*# 1.47*# 
1.3 Top management 
names / experience. 
3.65 1.85*# 1.26*# 1.66*# 1.58*# 
1.4 Majority of 
stockholders (composition 
of shareholdings). 
2.06 1.64*# 1.32*# 1.59*# 1.51*# 
1.5 Organization structure. 2.23 1.52*# 1.65# 1.41*# 1.53*# 
1.6 Statement of corporate 
goals and objectives. 
2.03 1.61 1.65 1.31*# 1.53# 
1.7 Presentation of annual 
reports  
2.50 1.24*# 1.74*# 1.55*# 1.51*# 
2. Market Disclosure      
2.1 Industry size. 3.71 1.42*# 1.50*# 1.52*# 1.48*# 
2.2 Product (s) 
information. 
3.71 1.33*# 1.56*# 1.41*# 1.44*# 
2.3 Customers’ 
information. 
3.68 1.69*# 1.35*# 1.41*# 1.48*# 
2.4 Supplier information. 3.55 2.22*# 1.38*# 1.55*# 1.72*# 
2.5 Market(s) information. 3.74 2.09*# 1.41*# 1.38*# 1.64*# 
2.6 Market share. 2.32 1.82*# 1.82*# 1.41*# 1.70*# 
2.7 Competitive 
environment. 
2.26 1.67*# 2.03 1.69*# 1.80*# 
2.8 Productivity capacity. 2.55 1.85*# 1.91*# 1.52*# 1.77*# 
2.9 Productivity indicators. 2.35 1.91*# 1.76*# 1.55*# 1.75*# 
2.10 Marketing networks. 3.35 1.91*# 2.09*# 1.69*# 1.91*# 
2.11 Physical outputs. 3.84 2.06*# 1.82*# 1.86*# 1.92*# 
3. Risk Management 
Disclosure 
     
3.1 Financial risk (interest 
rate, currency, credit & 
financial Instruments). 
1.48 1.39 2.03*# 1.72*# 1.72* 
3.2 Political risk 
(international business). 
1.55 1.48 1.91 1.28 1.57 
3.3 Market risk 
(competition, market 
share). 
1.68 1.45 1.79* 1.55 1.63* 
3.4 Technology risk (rapid 
change) 
1.68 1.44 1.88* 1.38 1.67* 
3.5 Environmental risk 
(laws & regulations). 
1.68 1.55 1.82* 1.41 1.65 
3.6 Weather risk (climate 
conditions). 
1.77 2.18 2.09* 1.69 2.00* 
3.7 Government regulation 
risk (control, regulation, 
taxation). 
 
1.77 1.42* 1.97* 1.52 1.65 
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Statements Mean Responses 
 Auditors Academics Investors Bankers Overall 
3.8 Seasonality risk 
(natural seasonal 
patterns). 
1.48 1.81 1.79* 1.55* 1.78* 
3.9 Operational risk 
(technical, accidents, 
human error & loss). 
1.42 3.15*# 2.06*# 1.69* 2.40* 
3.10 Cyclicality risk 
(natural cyclical trend). 
1.26 1.88*# 2.03*# 1.86*# 1.86*# 
3.11 Suppliers risk (Main 
Supplier). 
1.29 1.79*# 1.71*# 1.72*# 1.73*# 
3.12 Natural resources risk 
(reserves quality and 
quantity). 
1.19 2.24*# 1.91*# 1.28* 1.98*# 
4. Financial Disclosure      
4.1 Financial ratios & 
statistics. 
1.26 1.61*# 1.88*# 1.86*# 1.63*# 
4.2 Industry ratios. 1.23 1.33 2.00*# 1.79*# 1.67*# 
4.3 Using charts, graphs, 
photos. 
2.10 2.24 1.79* 2.03 1.65*# 
4.4 Market Share price. 1.16 2.00*# 1.74# 1.86*# 2.00*# 
4.5 Bank loans, mortgages 
and their uses. 
1.90 2.15 1.71* 1.90 1.65*# 
4.6 Information of capital 
structure. 
1.65 1.42 1.91 1.90 1.78 
4.7 Information of 
dividends policy. 
2.06 1.82 1.85 2.00 2.40 
4.8 Reasons and effects of 
acquisions / disposals on 
past results. 
1.81 2.24*# 2.15# 1.90 1.86 
4.9 Information of foreign 
sales. 
1.77 2.85*# 2.21# 1.86 1.73 
4.10 Financial information 
on quarterly basis. 
1.42 1.82*# 1.97*# 1.55 1.98*# 
4.11 Changes in inventory 
level. 
1.65 2.00*# 1.47* 1.72 1.73 
4.12 Dividends per share 
compared with previous 
years. 
1.39 2.06*# 1.91# 1.86*# 1.95*# 
5. Human Resources 
Disclosure 
     
5.1 Consultation with 
employees. 
4.35 1.85*# 2.06# 1.45*# 1.80*# 
5.2 Employee share 
ownership. 
1.84 3.06*# 1.97* 1.52 2.21*# 
5.3 Employment data. 3.94 3.27*# 2.09*# 1.62*# 2.35*# 
5.4 Pension commitment. 1.77 2.91*# 2.21 1.72 2.30*# 
5.5 Employees health & 
safety. 
1.65 3.28*# 1.79 1.72* 2.27*# 
5.6 Average compensation 
of employees. 
3.90 3.12*# 1.97*# 1.83*# 2.32*# 
5.7 Percentage of foreign 
and national labour force. 
4.06 3.24*# 1.68*# 1.62*# 2.20*# 
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Statements Mean Responses 
 Auditors Academics Investors Bankers Overall 
5.8 Information of training 
and employee 
development. 
3.68 3.24*# 2.21*# 1.86*# 2.46*# 
5.9 Number of employees 
trained. 
3.35 3.12 1.88*# 1.83*# 1.73*# 
5.10 Amount spent on 
training. 
3.52 2.03*# 1.79*# 1.62*# 1.95*# 
6. Research & 
Development Disclosure 
     
6.1 Inputs: Product. 1.52 1.79 1.47* 1.93*# 1.80*# 
6.2 Inputs: People. 3.94 2.24* 1.70# 1.66*# 2.21*# 
6.3 Input: Infrastructure. 1.68 2.15*# 1.79* 1.62 2.35*# 
6.4 Outputs: Actual 
achievements (Product 
development). 
2.68 2.24*# 1.41# 1.59*# 2.30*# 
6.5 Outputs: Actual 
achievements (Beyond 
Product development). 
2.26 2.64 1.24*# 1.86*# 2.27 
6.6 Outputs: Potential 
achievements. 
3.00 2.33*# 1.38*# 1.69*# 2.32*# 
6.7 Output: Product timing. 1.74 2.27*# 1.38*# 1.52 2.20*# 
6.8 Future expenditures. 1.81 2.30*# 1.65 1.66 2.46*# 
6.9 Financing Past, 
Present, and Future. 
1.71 2.39*# 1.65 1.79 1.95 
6.10 Accounting/ financing 
(Comparing prior years, 
competition, budget). 
1.74 2.12*# 1.41*# 1.66 1.73 
6.11 R&D ratios. 1.74 1.73 1.38*# 1.66 1.58 
6.12 R&D as explanatory. 2.65 2.73 1.76*# 1.72*# 2.08*# 
6.13 Explaining R&D 
changes. 
3.06 2.48*# 1.53*# 1.76*# 1.93*# 
7. Environmental, Social, 
and Ethical Disclosure 
     
7.1 Environmental reports. 1.94 2.21* 1.44*# 2.00 1.88 
7.2 Value added 
statement. 
2.03 1.70 1.38*# 2.03 1.69# 
7.3 Social activities Cont. 1.61 1.48 1.76 2.04* 1.75 
7.4 Environmental health 
safety. 
1.77 2.03* 1.47 1.45* 1.66 
7.5 Energy Information. 3.32 2.76*# 1.47*# 1.66*# 1.97*# 
7.6 Community 
information. 
3.35 2.18*# 1.59*# 1.52*# 1.77*# 
7.7 Charitable donations 
information. 
3.39 3.52 1.88*# 1.83*# 2.43*# 
7.8 Using photocopy of 
awarded certificates. 
1.77 3.27*# 1.79 1.90 2.33*# 
7.9 Methods of provisions 
computation. 
1.32 1.88*# 2.62*# 1.90*# 2.15*# 
7.10 Employment of 
disabilities. 
3.61 2.33*# 1.88*# 1.62*# 1.96*# 
7.11 Ethical actions. 2.29 2.18 1.82*# 2.45 2.14 
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Statements Mean Responses 
 Auditors Academics Investors Bankers Overall 
8. Corporate Governance 
Disclosure 
     
8.1 Major share ownership 
and voting rights. 
1.26 1.61*# 1.82*# 1.41 1.63*# 
8.2 List of board members. 3.23 1.82*# 1.71*# 1.97*# 1.82*# 
8.3 Picture of chairperson 
and/or other members. 
3.45 2.12*# 1.91*# 1.90*# 1.98*# 
8.4 Board member 
qualifications. 
3.42   3.12 1.88*# 1.83*# 2.29*# 
8.5 Number of shares held 
by members of the board. 
2.00 2.21 1.91 1.66 1.94 
8.6 Remuneration policy 
for board members and 
key executives. 
2.97 2.24*# 1.76*# 2.00*# 2.00*# 
8.7 Audit committee 
members: names, 
addresses, experiences  
3.84 3.12*# 1.68*# 2.10*# 2.30*# 
8.8 Corporate governance 
codes, policies, 
implementation extent. 
1.49 1.55 1.76 1.76 1.69 
*Significantly different from auditors at ρ ≤ 0.05 (Mann-Whitney U test) 
#Significantly different from auditors at t ≤ 0.05 (t-test) 
 
Table 4 represents the proposed method for the reduction of the existence AEG. 
The method is based on expanding the auditors’ roles and responsibilities to include 
UVD, which satisfies the different stakeholders’ expectations, represented by the non-
auditors’ groups, and in turn reduces the auditing expectations gap. Regarding the 
general disclosure (statement 1), there is agreement among the non-auditors’ groups 
that auditing general disclosure items would contribute to the reduction of the AEG. 
On the other hand, auditors’ group disagreed that auditing of the company’s mission 
and vision (statement 1.1), and the top management names and experiences 
(statement 1.3) would reduce AEG, while agreed that auditing the rest of general 
disclosure items would reduce the AEG.  
However, there is only insignificant difference between auditors’ and overall non-
auditors’ group regarding auditing the statement of corporate goals and objectives to 
reduce the auditing expectation gap, while there is significant difference between 
auditors group and overall non-auditors’ groups concerning the rest of the general 
disclosure items. 
In relation to the market disclosure (statement 2), auditors’ group agreed that 
auditing the market share (statement 2.6), competitive environment (statement 2.7), 
productivity capacity (statement 2.8), and productivity indicators (statement 2.9) 
information would reduce AEG. On the other hand, this group disagreed that auditing 
any of the remaining items would reduce AEG. The non-auditors’ groups agreed that 
auditing any of the market disclosure items would reduce AEG. However, there is 
significant difference between auditors’ group and overall non- auditors’ group 
indicating that auditing the items of market disclosure items would not effectively 
reduce AEG. 
With respect to the risk management disclosure (statement 3), it was interesting 
observation that both auditors and non-auditors’ groups agreed that auditing risk 
management disclosure would contribute to the reduction of AEG. However, there are 
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insignificant differences between auditors’ group and overall non- auditors’ ones 
regarding that auditing political (international) risk disclosure (statement 3.2), 
environmental risk disclosure (statement 3.5), and government regulation risk 
disclosure (statement 3.7) would effectively reduce AEG. While on the other hand, 
there are significant differences between auditor groups and non-auditor groups 
regarding the rest of the risk management disclosure items. 
Similarly, regarding the voluntary financial disclosure, both auditors and non-
auditors’ groups agree that using ADA to audit these disclosures would reduce AEG. 
However, there are insignificant differences between auditors and non-auditors’ 
groups regarding using ADA for information of capital structure disclosure (statement 
4.6), information of dividends policy disclosure (statement 4.7), reasons and effects of 
acquisitions / disposals on past results disclosure (statement 4.8), information of 
foreign sales (statement 4.9), and changes in inventory disclosure (statement 4.11) 
would effectively reduce AEG. On the other hand, using ADA for the other voluntary 
financial disclosure items would not contribute effectively to the reduction of AEG. 
Concerning human resources disclosure (statement 5), auditors’ group agreed 
that auditing only employee share ownership disclosure (statement 5.2), pension 
commitment disclosure (statement 5.4), and employees’ health and safety disclosure 
(statement 5.5) would reduce AEG. Otherwise, none of the other human resources 
disclosure’s auditing would reduce the AEG. While non-auditor groups agreed that 
auditing all the human resources disclosure items leads to the reduction of AEG. 
However, there is significant difference between auditors and overall non-auditors’ 
groups concerning the auditing of human resources disclosure, which indicates that 
the human resources disclosure auditing would not effectively reduce AEG. 
With respect to research and development disclosure (statement 6), auditors’ 
group agreed that using ADA for these items of this sort of disclosure would reduce 
that AEG, except for the auditing of the inputs (people) disclosure (statement 6.2), 
output (potential achievement) disclosure (statement 6.6), and explaining the research 
and development changes disclosure (statement 6.13), they disagree upon that 
auditing of these items would reduce AEG. On the other hand, non-auditor groups 
agreed upon auditing the different items would reduce AEG.  
There is insignificant difference between the auditors and non-auditors’ groups 
regarding the suggested auditing outputs (actual achievements beyond product 
development) disclosure (statement 6.5), financing past, present and future disclosure 
(statement 6.9), accounting/financing (comparing prior years, competition, budget) 
disclosure (statement 6.10), and research and development ratios (statement 6.11) 
would contribute effectively to the reduction of AEG, while the other items would not.  
Moreover, non-auditors’ groups agreed that using ADA to audit all the 
environmental, social, and ethical disclosure (statement 7) items would reduce the 
existing AEG, while auditors’ group disagreed that auditing of the energy information 
disclosure (statement 7.5), community information disclosure (statement 7.6), 
charitable donations information disclosure (statement 7.7), and employment of 
disabilities disclosure (statement 7.10) would reduce this gap.  
There is insignificant difference between auditors and overall non-auditors’ 
groups regarding the suggestion that auditing of the ethical reports (statement 7.1), 
value added statement (statement 7.2), social activities contributions disclosure 
(statement 7.3), environmental health and safety disclosure (statement 7.4), and 
ethical actions disclosure (statement 7.11) would effectively reduce this existing gap 
rather than the other environmental, social, and ethical items.    
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Finally, concerning corporate governance disclosure (statement 8), as usual non-
auditors’ groups agreed that using ADA for these items would reduce AEG, while the 
auditors’ group agreed that auditing only the major share ownership and voting rights 
disclosure (statement 8.1), number of shares held by members of the board disclosure 
(statement 8.5), remuneration policy for board members and key executives 
(statement 8.6), and corporate governance codes, policies, implementation extent 
disclosure (statement 8.8) would reduce the existing gap.  
There is insignificant difference between auditors and overall non-auditors’ 
groups regarding the idea of using ADA to audit the disclosure of number of shares 
held by members of the board disclosure (statement 8.5) would reduce this AEG, while 
there are significant differences between the both groups regarding the other items.   
 
8.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
To examine how sensitive the results, a t-test is applying over the previously 
examined data using the Mann-Whitney U non-parametric test. The significant 
differences between the score means of the various respondents is measured using 
the t-test, since there is an existence of significant difference between the auditor and 
the non-auditor group if the t value ≤ 0.05, otherwise the difference between the two 
groups is insignificant. The results of the t-test are compared to the results of the 
Mann-Whitney U non-parametric test to examine the sensitivity of the results towards 
changing of the applied test. 
It is observable from the previous analysis that the significant difference analysis 
using the t-test analysis do not differ significantly from the results of the Mann-Whitney 
U non-parametric test, especially on the overall level, which indicates that the results 
are non-sensitive to the change of statistical test. This sensitivity analysis result 
confirms, and support, the results of the Mann-Whitney results, and evidence that this 
selected statistical test fits with the examined data.   
 
9. Conclusion and Future Suggestions 
 
The previous discussion provides different evidences regarding the role of using 
ADA for UVDA in reducing AEG. The interesting point is that due to agency conflicts, 
some studies show that this role is still questionable due to the credibility and reliability 
of this type of disclosure. 
This additional assurance service needs to be performed using ADA to deal with 
such big un-structured data from diverse data sources and in different formats.  
As a result, expanding the role of auditor, to include additional assurance using 
ADA of the UVD, to satisfy users’ needs and expectations towards his/her roles and 
responsibilities, is highly recommended. It is expected that approaching the 
satisfaction of users’ needs and expectations will reduce AEG. To this extent, we 
argue that using ADA of un-regulated voluntary disclosures will expand the auditor’s 
role, to provide assurance and credibility to this type of disclosures, which 
consequently will lead to the reduction of AEG.  
ADA of un-structured voluntary disclosers, can be provided by audit firms 
different from the one auditing the mandatory disclosures to maintain auditors’ 
independency in compliance with the SOX and ISA requirements. As a result, firms’ 
will be exposed to an extended oversight practices provided by dual audit partners. 
Therefore, this will maintain audit firms’ independency leading to robust assurance and 
credible information. The study suggests providing an additional assurance service 
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that will be complementing the statuary audit. The additional assurance will be 
concerned with a wide range of big data, in comparison to statuary audit which focuses 
on structured financial information. This new service will expand the role of assurance 
services provided to the different types of un-regulated voluntary disclosures, to meet 
the different users’ expectations, not just in relation to the quantity of disclosed 
information, but  also, the quality of this information in terms of its credibility. This is 
not to say that we suggest to mandate the un-regulated voluntary disclosers, otherwise 
it losses its value and relevance, but to ensure that any un-regulated information 
voluntarily disclosed by any organization, is being assured, using audit data analytics 
tools. The suggested service will be requiring new capabilities and skills, different from 
those required by statuary audit providers, creating new opportunities, as well as 
challenges, in terms recruiting and training a new generation of un-regulated voluntary 
disclosures assurance providers, whom can manage and deal with structured and 
unstructured data using contemporary audit data analytics techniques.  
Finally, Our study provides a new insight towards reducing audit expectations 
gap through using audit data analytics tools and techniques to provide assurance 
service for un-regulated voluntary disclosures, but it didn’t discuss the challenges 
associated with this new services with regards to the different set of skills required and 
how education and professional training will be able to provide these expertise. 
Additionally, the study did not investigate the providers point of view of how 
comfortable they are in sharing this level of detailed information with an external 
independent party and whether the providers are owning appropriate internal control 
systems which can synchronize with the assurance providers sophisticated audit data 
analytics tools. These areas need to be investigated by further research to address 
the different challenges and may be resistance to implement such assurance service 
from a preparer point of view. 
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Appendix 
 
Research Questionnaire 
     
 
Dear Respondent, 
 
I wish to have your attention towards my research. It aims to investigate the impact of providing 
Unregulated Voluntary Disclosures Assurance (UVDA) using Audit Data Analytics (ADA) on 
reducing the Auditing Expectations Gap (AEG).  The research uses the questionnaire technique 
as to capture the data about the different perceptions of different samples about this problem. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank you for having your attention towards this questionnaire, which 
considered being the corner stone of the research results. 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks for your time and attention 
                                                                                                 The Researcher 
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Section I 
Demographic Information 
Please tick in front of the answer that fits with your personal information: 
1. Do you have Accounting qualifications? 
Yes   [     ]                         No   [     ] 
2. Do you have accounting experience? 
Yes   [     ]                        No   [     ] 
3. If yes, how many years? 
2 – 5 years   [     ]          5 – 10 years   [     ]         Over 10 years   [     ] 
4. What is your occupation? 
            Auditor   [     ]       Banker   [     ]     Investor [     ]   Academic [     ] 
5. How long have you been in your present occupation? 
      2 – 5 years   [     ]          5 – 10 years   [     ]         Over 10 years   [     ] 
6. Do you wish to have a copy of the analyzed results emailed to you? 
            Yes   [     ]                         No   [     ] 
7. If yes, please provide your email address. 
[                                                                                       ] 
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Section II 
The Role of Unregulated Voluntary Disclosures Assurance (UVDA) using Audit 
Data Analytics (ADA) in Reducing the Auditing Expectations Gap (AEG) 
 
 
 
Identify to which extent do you agree or disagree that expanding the auditors’ roles and 
responsibilities to include the provision of UVDA for the following UVDs using ADA 
would contribute to the reduction of the AEG, using a scale of 1 to 5 as shown below: 
 
Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. General Disclosure      
1.1 Mission & vision. 1 2 3 4 5 
1.2 Statement of corporate 
strategy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.3 Top management names / 
experience. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.4 Majority of stockholders 
(composition of shareholdings). 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.5 Organization structure. 1 2 3 4 5 
1.6 Statement of corporate goals 
and objectives. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.7 Presentation of annual reports 
in Arabic & English. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Market Disclosure      
2.1 Industry size. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.2 Product (s) information. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.3 Customers’ information. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.4 Supplier information. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.5 Market (s) information. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.6 Market share. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.7 Competitive environment. 1 2 3 4 5 
30 
Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2.8 Productivity capacity. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.9 Productivity indicators. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.10 Marketing networks. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.11 Physical outputs. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Risk Management Disclosure      
3.1 Financial risk (interest rate, 
currency, credit & fin. 
Instruments). 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.2 Political risk (international 
business). 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.3 Market risk (competition, 
market share). 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.4 Technology risk (rapid 
change) 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.5 Environmental risk (laws & 
regulations). 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.6 Weather risk (climate 
conditions). 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.7 Government regulation risk 
(control, regulation, taxation). 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.8 Seasonality risk (natural 
seasonal patterns). 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.9 Operational risk (technical, 
accidents, human error & loss). 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.10 Cyclicality risk (natural 
cyclical trend). 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11 Suppliers risk (Main 
Supplier) 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.12 Natural resources risk 
(reserves quality and quantity). 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
4. Financial Disclosure      
4.1 Financial ratios & statistics. 1 2 3 4 5 
4.2 Industry ratios. 1 2 3 4 5 
4.3 Using charts, graphs, photos. 1 2 3 4 5 
4.4 Market Share price. 1 2 3 4 5 
4.5 Bank loans, mortgages and 
their uses. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.6 Information of capital 
structure. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.7 Information of dividends 
policy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.8 Reasons and effects of 
acquisions / disposals on past 
results. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.9 Information of foreign sales. 1 2 3 4 5 
4.10 Financial information on 
quarterly basis. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.11 Changes in inventory level. 1 2 3 4 5 
4.12 Dividends per share 
compared with previous years. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Human Resources Disclosure      
5.1 Consultation with employees. 1 2 3 4 5 
5.2 Employee share ownership. 1 2 3 4 5 
5.3 Employment data. 1 2 3 4 5 
5.4 Pension commitment. 1 2 3 4 5 
5.5 Employees health & safety. 1 2 3 4 5 
5.6 Average compensation of 
employees. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.7 Percentage of foreign and 
national labour force. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
      
5.8 Information of training and 
employee development. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.9 Number of employees trained. 1 2 3 4 5 
5.10 Amount spent on training. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Research & Development 
Disclosure 
     
6.1 Inputs: Product. 1 2 3 4 5 
6.2 Inputs: People. 1 2 3 4 5 
6.3 Input: Infrastructure. 1 2 3 4 5 
6.4 Outputs: Actual achievements 
(Product development). 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.5 Outputs: Actual achievements 
(Beyond Product development). 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.6 Outputs: Potential 
achievements. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.7 Output: Product timing. 1 2 3 4 5 
6.8 Future expenditures. 1 2 3 4 5 
6.9 Financing Past, Present, and 
Future. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.10 Accounting/ financing 
(Comparing prior years, 
competition, budget). 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.11 R&D ratios. 1 2 3 4 5 
6.12 R&D as explanatory. 1 2 3 4 5 
6.13 Explaining R&D changes. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Environmental, Social, and 
Ethical Disclosure 
     
7.1 Environmental reports. 1 2 3 4 5 
7.2 Value added statement. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
7.3 Social activities & 
contributions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.4 Environmental health safety. 1 2 3 4 5 
7.5 Energy Information. 1 2 3 4 5 
7.6 Community information. 1 2 3 4 5 
7.7 Charitable donations 
information. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.8 Using photocopy of awarded 
certificates. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.9 Methods of provisions 
computation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.10 Employment of disabilities. 1 2 3 4 5 
7.11 Ethical actions. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Corporate Governance 
Disclosure 
     
8.1 Major share ownership and 
voting rights. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.2 List of board members. 1 2 3 4 5 
8.3 Picture of chairperson and/or 
other members. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.4 Board member qualifications. 1 2 3 4 5 
8.5 Number of shares held by 
members of the board. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.6 Remuneration policy for board 
members and key executives. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.7 Audit committee members: 
names, addresses, experiences  
1 2 3 4 5 
8.8 Corporate governance codes, 
policies, implementation extent. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
